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INTRODUCTION
This case is about Medicaid reimbursement for a bone marrow transplant for Sean
Daugaard, a 5-year-old boy with Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia, life-threatening cancer.
The Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF" or "Agency") does not dispute the
medical necessity of the procedure, the appropriateness of care, or Sean's eligibility for
Medicaid assistance. Rather, the DHCF denied reimbursement to Primary Children's
Hospital solely because the Hospital did not fax the prior authorization request form
before performing the transplant. Thus, the DHCF attempts to boil the entire case down
into a simplistic syllogism: The rules require prior authorization, and the Hospital did
not request prior authorization; therefore, the Hospital is not entitled to reimbursement.
However, this mechanical analysis deceptively ignores the key, unchallenged
points of the Hospital's case: (1) the rules nowhere specify nonpayment as the automatic
penalty for lack of prior authorization alone; (2) the DHCF itself prevented prior
authorization by its own misrepresentation that Sean was not Medicaid-eligible upon
admission to the Hospital; (3) the DHCF deviated from prior practice by failing to notify
the Hospital of its error upon reinstating Sean's eligibility; (4) the purposes for prior
authorization can be served as well in this case through retroactive authorization; (5) the
DHCF deviated from prior practice by denying retroactive authorization for admittedly
necessary and proper care; and (6) denial of reimbursement on these facts produces an
unjust result that is likely to deter future participation in the Medicaid program.
Based on these unrefuted points, the Agency's decision denying payment for
Sean's transplant service must be reversed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

A,

DENIAL OF PAYMENT FOR LACK OF PRIOR
AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND PRIOR
AGENCY PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND IS
OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

Application of Statutes and Regulations.
The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief that the statutes and regulations do

not specify nonpayment as the penalty for lack of prior authorization of otherwise
necessary and appropriate services. (Pet. Br. 13-14.) To summarize, the prior
authorization provision itself contains no penalty. U.A.C. R414-10A-6(1). The sole
purpose of the prior authorization requirement is to verify that services are necessary and
appropriate. See U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(2)(a). The Agency concedes this purpose. (Br. of
Aplee. 11.) Consistent with that purpose, the Agency is authorized to deny payment only
for "services that fail to meet criteria . . . concerning medical necessity or
appropriateness." U.C.A. § 26-18-2.3(1). Accordingly, in cases such as the present,
where necessity and appropriateness of care are admitted, lack of prior authorization
alone is not a valid basis to withhold payment. No purpose is served by withholding
payment in this case.
Moreover, necessity and appropriateness of care can be determined as easily and
accurately after the procedure as before, without any risk or loss to the Agency. The
entire risk of proceeding without prior authorization is on the provider, not the Agency.
If a provider proceeds without prior authorization, it risks that its services may

2

subsequently be determined unnecessary or inappropriate. In such a case, payment is
appropriately denied on the statutory grounds that the services fail to meet criteria for
"medical necessity or appropriateness," 26-18-2.3(1), not for lack of prior authorization.
The Agency argues that it needs information regarding necessity and
appropriateness of care to guard against "unnecessary utilization of services," citing the
prior authorization regulation. (Br. of Aplee. 11.) However, the Agency fails to mention
that such supporting information can be, and generally is, submitted after the prior
authorization request, with the only consequence being "delay [in] processing the
request." R414-10A-6(2). As a matter of routine practice, and as conceded by Agency
counsel, the "prior authorization" requirement is met by simply faxing a prior
authorization request form to the Agency and supplying the supporting information as it
is gathered later. (Tr. 73-74, 93-94.) Thus, payment was denied in this case, not for
failure to obtain prior authorization, but solely for failure to request prior authorization.
(Reply Add. 12.) Any actual authorization or approval comes in the form of payment
following the services. The Agency can thus perform its safeguarding function whether
authorization is requested before or after the service. The only departure from the
routine in this case is that the prior authorization request form was prepared on the last
day of hospitalization rather than the first day, and that departure was attributable to the
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Agency's own misinformation regarding Sean's eligibility. The Agency was in no way
disadvantaged by the late authorization request.1
The Agency cites U.A.C. R414-10-5 for the proposition that lack of prior
authorization provides independent grounds to withhold payment for services in this
case. (Br. of Aplee. 12.) However, that provision refers to coverage of physician
services. In this case, obviously, the Hospital seeks reimbursement for provision of
inpatient hospital services, which is governed by a different regulation, R414-2A, which
provision contains no specific authorization to withhold payment for lack of prior
authorization.
In summary, lack of a prior authorization request cannot be invoked as a basis to
deny payment when such authorization was prevented by the Agency's own
misrepresentation regarding Sean's Medicaid eligibility, and the purpose of prior
authorization, to verify necessity and appropriateness of care, is admittedly satisfied.
Here, the Agency lulled the Hospital into an informal practice of prior authorization that
permitted the authorization request form to be faxed whenever eligibility was established,
with supporting information provided on an ongoing basis, and with actual approval
returned sometime after review of the information and completion of the services. In

The Agency asserts that failure to have a utilization review plan would jeopardize its participation
in the Medicaid program. (Br. of Aplee. 12.) However, the Hospital is not suggesting that utilization
review is unimportant or not legally required. Rather, the Hospital's position is simply that such review
can and generally does follow the service, without diminishing the purpose or benefit of the review, when
prior authorization cannot be obtained. Agency counsel admitted that the Agency has followed such a
policy in the past. (Tr. 15-16.)
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other words, the Agency has never strictly required prior authorization, but merely
submission of a prior authorization request form as soon as eligibility was established.
At trial, the Agency did not assert lack of prior authorization, but merely failure to fax a
prior authorization request form before the transplant. (Tr. 93-94.) However, the
Agency may not, upon receiving a large bill that it does not want to pay, simply ignore
past practice and invoke a strict interpretation of prior authorization to avoid payment.
Such conduct is not only unauthorized by the Medicaid statutes and regulations, but is
unlawful, arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedures Act,
section 63-46b-16(4)(d) and (h).
B.

Analysis of Agency Case Law,
The Agency relies principally on South Davis Community Hosp., Inc. v.

Department of Health, 869 P.2d 979 (Utah App. 1994), to support denial of payment in
this case; however, that case is distinguishable, both factually and legally. In South
Davis, the court upheld denial of Medicaid reimbursement because the hospital failed to
provide a required preadmission certification that the proposed services were needed. Id.
at 982-83. However, that result was justified because necessity of the services was
disputed; denial of reimbursement was based on the hospital's "own inaction," id. at 984;
the patient's eligibility was never in question; the hospital never did certify a need for the
services; there was no provision for, or practice of, retroactive certification; and denial
was reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. By contrast, in the
present case the Agency's own misrepresentation of ineligibility upon admission
5

precluded submission of the prior authorization form; that form could not be submitted
until after eligibility was reestablished. In addition, here the Agency concedes the
necessity and appropriateness of the service, and the Hospital did submit the required
form, albeit at the end of hospitalization instead of the beginning. Moreover, the
Agency's own regulations and practice permitted retroactive authorization of services,
justifying review of its action under the higher correction-of-error standard. See U.A.C.
R414-10A-4(5); U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(d), (h)(ii)-(iii).
The Agency also cites Mercy Hospital v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 492
A.2d 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985), to support nonpayment. However, that case merely
illustrates the harshness and injustice that can result from mechanical application of
regulations. There, the state denied reimbursement for the care of a patient whose
transfer to another facility was prevented by the state's own delay in approving the
transfer. The hospital argued that the state was equitably estopped to deny
reimbursement, but the court denied relief because "no misrepresentations were made by
[the state]." Id. at 106. By contrast, the Agency in the present case indisputably
misrepresented that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission and failed to notify the
Hospital upon correcting his eligibility status. Moreover, the present case is based not
only on estoppel, but on express provision for retroactive authorization and relief from
inconsistent agency practice.
The third case relied on by the Agency, Baptist Memorial Hosp. v. Marsaw, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 696 (D. Tenn. 1998), is also distinguishable because it is a private insurance
6

coverage case governed by ERISA. There, the health insurer denied coverage for
hospital services because the claim was submitted beyond the one-year claims period set
out in the policy. The policy expressly made timely submission of the claim a condition
to payment of benefits. Id. at 702. The court merely held that it was not arbitrary or
capricious for the insurer to follow its policy. Id. at 700-02. The court denied relief
under equitable estoppel because the insurer had made no representation that it would
deviate from its policy terms. Id. at 703-04. By contrast, unlike the policy in Marsaw,
the Agency's regulations here do not authorize withholding payment solely for lack of
prior authorization. Moreover, again, the present case is reviewed for correction of error,
not merely abuse of discretion. Finally, equitable estoppel does apply in the present case
because the Agency misrepresented Sean's eligibility status, precluding submission of
the prior authorization form upon admission.
In summary, the cases relied on by the Agency do not compel the harsh and
inequitable result of denying reimbursement for Sean's transplant in this case.
C.

The Agency Has Failed to Refute the Legal Grounds for Relief.
The Agency now asserts that it does not concede appropriateness of the

transplant services rendered to Sean, and that appropriateness cannot be presumed for
lack of evidence in the record. (Br. of Aplee. 19.) This is a bad faith argument.
The Agency reviewed Sean's medical records in November 1997 and initially
recommended denial of payment based on several different provisions of R414-10A-6(3)
and R414-10A-9(2)-(5), none of which is lack of prior authorization. (See Agency Case
7

Summary, Pet. Add. 20.) In fact, the Agency skipped right over subparts (1) and (2) of
R414-10A-6, which do refer to lack of prior authorization. By skipping over those
provisions, the Agency implicitly accepted the request for retroactive authorization and
denied payment based solely on lack of medical documentation. (See cited regulations,
Pet. Add. 54-57.) This basis for denial was plainly set forth in the Agency's written
Notice of Denial Due To Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, dated December
24, 1997. (R. 4; Reply Add. 1.) In a letter dated January 7, 1998, the Hospital responded
that the documentation cited by the Agency had already been provided and could not be
more clear. (R. 3, Reply Add. 5.) On March 4, 1998, apparently concerned with the
sufficiency of its grounds for denial, the Agency sent an Amended Notice of Denial Due
to Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, adding lack of prior authorization, R41410A-6(1), as a basis for denial. (R. 27, Reply Add. 6.) On July 23, 1998, just three
weeks prior to the hearing, the Agency sent a second Amended Notice of Denial Due to
Lack of Substantiation of Medicaid Criteria, dropping all grounds relating to
documentation of necessity and appropriateness of care, and listing only lack of a prior
authorization request as the basis for denial of payment. (R. 75, Reply Add. 11-12.)
By abandoning all grounds for denial related to necessity and appropriateness of
care, the Agency conceded that those grounds do not exist, and that the services rendered
were necessary and appropriate. Moreover, that Agency admission rendered evidence on
those issues unnecessary and immaterial. In response to the hearing officer's question of
whether the issue in the case was compliance with Medicaid criteria or "merely a prior
8

authorization issue," the Agency's own counsel responded that "it's merely a prior
authorization issue." (Tr. 6.) Accordingly, the Agency cannot frame the issue at trial to
make evidence on necessity and appropriateness of care immaterial, and later assert on
appeal that necessity and appropriateness have not been established for lack of evidence.
The Agency disputes the Hospital's assertion that the prior authorization rule has
never been applied to withhold payment for admittedly reasonable and necessary
services, citing the South Davis case. (Br. of Aplee. 19.) However, in South Davis,
necessity of services was not admitted; it was the central dispute. The court denied
reimbursement not only for lack of prior certification of necessity, but for lack of any
certification, rejecting the mere submission of medical records as the equivalent of
certification. 869P.2dat 983. By contrast, as shown above, the Agency in this case
concedes necessity of the services. Where necessity is conceded, withholding payment
for not faxing a prior authorization form upon admission is not only unlawful, and a
departure from prior practice, but arbitrary and capricious, as it serves no purpose.
Moreover, contrary to the Agency's assertion, this argument does not mean that the
Agency can "no longer require prior authorization." (Br. of Aplee. 19.) It only means
that prior authorization alone cannot be used to deny payment when the purpose of such
review (verification of necessity and appropriateness of care) is admittedly satisfied.
The Agency also denies that it acted contrary to prior practice. (Br. of Aplee. 1920.) However, the Agency confuses the testimony and overlooks the express findings
and conclusions of the hearing officer. With regard to prior authorization, the Agency
9

departed from prior practice by failing to inform the Hospital of Sean's corrected
Medicaid eligibility status on July 9. (See Pet. Br. 17-19.) The evidence was undisputed
that the Agency "routinely" informed the Hospital of eligibility updates. (Tr. 29.) The
hearing officer so found: "Debbie Lucero normally informed Mr. Fairborn when cases
become eligible

[S]he failed to inform Mr. Fairborn of Sean's eligibility." (Finding

No. 13, Pet. Add. 5.) While that finding is correct, it does not support the hearing
officer's contrary conclusion of law. The officer concluded that Lucero had no duty to
inform the Hospital of eligibility changes, "although that had been her custom."
(Conclusion No. 1, Pet. Add. 5.) The Hospital was substantially prejudiced by Lucero's
departure from prior practice, because if the Hospital had been informed of Sean's
corrected eligibility status on July 9, it could easily have submitted the prior authorization
request form, instead of submitting a new Medicaid application, as directed by Lucero.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act mandates relief from such inconsistent agency
action. 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).2
Finally, the Agency attempts to distinguish several of the cases cited by the
Hospital; however, the discussion is not helpful or relevant because it is offered without
reference to the legal context in which the cases were cited. (Br. of Aplee. 20-23.)

2

The other instance of inconsistent Agency action is established by the testimony of Bernadette
McNally, to which the Agency refers on page 19 of its brief. However, this testimony pertains to the
Agency's practice of retroactive authorization, and is therefore best reserved for discussion in connection
with that separate legal theory. By discussing the McNally testimony in connection with the prior
authorization argument, the Agency has either confused the issues or overlooked the separate instance of
inconsistent conduct discussed above, as established by the testimony of Richard Fairborn.
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The Agency attempts to distinguish Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce, 858 P.2d
187 (Utah App. 1993), requiring consistency of agency action, by asserting that "no
evidence was presented at the hearing" to establish departure from prior Agency practice.
(Br. of Aplee. 20.) However, that assertion is false and demonstrates bad faith. As
shown above, Mr. Fairborn testified of inconsistent Agency action in failing to notify
him of Sean's corrected eligibility status. (Tr. 29; see Pet. Br. 17-19.) Bernadette
McNally testified of inconsistent Agency action in denying retroactive authorization of
the services (Tr. 70), and Agency counsel conceded such prior practice (Tr. 15-16). (See
Pet. Br. 23-24.) Accordingly, the record plainly establishes inconsistent Agency practice.
The cases of Ladd v. Thomas, 962 F. Supp. 284 (D. Conn. 1997), and Dodson v.
Parham, Ml F. Supp. 97 (D. Ga. 1977), were cited to show that, even absent a prior
practice, the Agency had a due process duty to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected
status. (Pet. Br. 19, n.4.) The cases of McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F. Supp. 633 (D.
Fla. 1992), Pittman v. Secretary, Florida DHRS, 998 F.2d 887 (11th Cir. 1993), and
Pereira v. Kozlowski, 996 F.2d 723 (4th Cir. 1993), were cited to show that Medicaid
coverage is mandated for bone marrow transplants on recipients under age twenty-one.
(Pet. Br. 12.) The cases of Society of the New York Hospital v. Mogensen, 319 N.Y.S.2d
258 (Misc. 1971), and In re Nemis, 351 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976), were cited to
show that Medicaid reimbursement should not be denied for technical noncompliance
with "procedural niceties," but that courts should "slice through the bureaucracy to insure
that payment is made to the innocent vendor." (Pet. Br. 15-16.) The Agency's effort to
11

lump all these cases together and to distinguish them on grounds unrelated to those for
which they were cited, or on the basis of immaterial fact variations, is unavailing.
In summary, the Agency has failed to refute the legal grounds justifying relief
from its administrative decision. The Agency has cited no authority to withhold payment
solely for lack of prior authorization of otherwise necessary and appropriate services.
The Agency does not dispute that its agent falsely informed the Hospital that Sean was
Medicaid ineligible upon admission, or that the agent failed to notify the Hospital upon
correcting Sean's eligibility status that same day. Nor does the Agency dispute that its
failure to notify the Hospital of Sean's corrected status was a departure from prior
Agency practice. The Agency's new argument, that the Hospital could have avoided this
dispute by seeking prior authorization before Sean's admission to the Hospital (Br. of
Aplee. 21), is merely wishful thinking that does not change the facts. The Hospital had
no duty to seek authorization prior to admission; in fact, the prior authorization request
form is typically transmitted upon hospital admission because the patient's condition and
treatment plan may, and often do, change prior to admission. The Agency was not
"prevented from performing its statutory oversight duties" (Br. of Aplee. 23) because the
Agency received and reviewed all necessary records and documentation and conceded
that the care was necessary and appropriate. Finally, the Hospital did not "abdicate] its
responsibility to get prior authorization" for Sean's transplant (Br. of Aplee. 24), as it was
prevented from doing so by the Agency's own misrepresentation and departure from prior
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practice. Based on these facts and legal principles, the Hospital is entitled to
reimbursement for the services rendered.3
POINT II:

DENIAL OF RETROACTIVE AUTHORIZATION IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND PRIOR AGENCY PRACTICE, IS AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, AND IS OTHERWISE ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS.

The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief two separate grounds for
retroactive authorization of Sean's transplant procedure: (1) Rule R414-10A-4(5); and
(2) prior Agency practice. (Pet. Br. 22-25.) In response, the Agency attempts to combine
the analysis by arguing both the facts of this case and prior Agency practice under the
elements of R414-10A-4(5). (Br. of Aplee. 25-26.) However, the two grounds must be
considered separately.
A.

Rule Providing Retroactive Authorization.
First, the Agency argues that R414-10A-4(5) does not apply because that

provision applies only to "emergency circumstances," and Sean's transplant was not an
emergency because the Hospital planned it from March to July 1997. However, the cited
rule for retroactive authorization applies to "transplantation services provided under
unusual emergency circumstances." (Pet. Add. 53, emp. added.) Even Agency counsel
construed this phrase to mean "unusual or emergency circumstances." (Tr. 15, emp.
The Agency challenges the notion of "deemed waiver" of its prior authorization requirement, based
upon its conduct that prevented compliance. (Br. of Aplee. 24-25.) However, the authorities for relief
cited by the Hospital are not limited to the theory of "waiver," but apply to any theory for equitable relief.
(See Pet. Br. 14-17.) While the Hospital may not have used the label of "waiver" in the administrative
hearing, all the supporting facts and equitable arguments are the same. Moreover, the theory of waiver
applies as well to the practice of retroactive authorization, which practice did manifest an intent to
relinquish the right to strict enforcement of prior authorization, as discussed below.
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added.) The word "unusual" must be given independent meaning and cannot be
rendered superfluous by reading it out of the regulation. The facts of this case are
certainly "unusual" in that the Agency prevented prior authorization by misrepresenting
Sean's true eligibility status upon admission, and by failing to inform the Hospital of
Sean's corrected status. Because the Hospital was thus prevented from obtaining prior
authorization, the Agency's provision for retroactive authorization should apply to
compensate for the Agency's own error.
Even judged by the term "emergency circumstances," this case qualifies because
Sean faced impending death. Moreover, the Hospital did not know in March, when
chemotherapy began, that a transplant would be necessary; in fact, the hope was that
chemotherapy would render a transplant unnecessary. Only after chemotherapy failed
was the transplant option pursued, and much of the time between May and July was spent
monitoring Sean's condition and searching for a bone marrow donor. (See Hospital
letter, Pet. Add. 14-17.) Accordingly, the passage of time alone should not be viewed as
diminishing the urgency or emergency nature of the situation. Moreover, the hearing
officer made absolutely no finding of fact to support her conclusion that this is not an
"unusual" or "emergency" case. (Concl. of Law No. 2.) Therefore, that conclusion must
be set aside. See Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Utah App. 1991).
B.

Prior Agency Practice of Retroactive Authorization.
Prior Agency practice provides a second, separate basis for retroactive

authorization, independent of the regulation. As a matter of common cooperative
14

practice between the Agency and the Hospital, if the Hospital was unable to submit a
prior authorization form because Medicaid eligibility had not yet been established, the
Hospital would proceed with needed treatment and submit the form as soon as the
Agency approved eligibility, without regard to unusual or emergency circumstances.
Bernadette McNally so testified:
Q. Have you, say, in the last year, had a situation where at the time
of admission a patient was ineligible for Medicaid but later was determined
to be eligible and then you submitted a request for retroactive prior
authorization? Have you had that situation?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. And was that approved?
A. Yes, it was approved. [Tr. 70.]
By denying retroactive authorization in this case, the Agency deviated from that prior
practice. Moreover, the Agency presented no evidence at trial to justify the
inconsistency, and the Hospital has certainly been "substantially prejudiced" by the
inconsistent Agency action; therefore, this Court is required to grant relief. U.C.A. § 6346b-16(4)(h)(iii).
In summary, based on regulation and prior practice, the Agency was required to
grant retroactive authorization of Sean's transplant, especially where the Agency's own
conduct prevented prior authorization. The Agency's conclusion to the contrary is
erroneous as a matter of law.
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POINT III: THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL REQUIRES
RELIEF FROM THE AGENCY DECISION IN ORDER TO
ACCOMPLISH JUSTICE IN THIS CASE.
A.

The Elements of Equitable Estoppel Are Satisfied.
The Hospital demonstrated in its opening brief that equitable estoppel requires

relief from the Agency decision in this case. (Pet. Br. 25-29.) Based on its
misrepresentation that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission, its failure to notify
the Hospital upon correcting Sean's eligibility status, and its practice of retroactive
authorization, the Agency is equitably estopped to deny authorization and withhold
payment for Sean's transplant.
The Agency argues that equitable estoppel should not apply because its agent,
Debbie Lucero, "did not say or do anything" that was inconsistent with a later claim, or
that would have precluded prior authorization. (Br. of Aplee. 28.) However, this
assertion is contrary to the record and the express findings of the hearing officer.
Richard Fairborn concluded from two different Agency sources, the Agency computer
data and Debbie Lucero, that Sean was Medicaid ineligible upon admission. Mr.
Fairborn testified that Lucero confirmed Sean was no longer eligible, that his eligibility
was under review, and that a new application was required "to begin the process over
again and then reestablish eligibility." (Tr. 21; see also Tr. 30-31.) Accordingly,
regardless of the actual words Lucero used, the bottom-line conclusion was the same:
Sean was no longer Medicaid eligible. The hearing officer expressly found that Lucero
confirmed Sean's ineligibility. (Findings 5-7, Pet. Add. 4.) These Agency
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representations prevented submission of a prior authorization request form because "we
cannot request prior authorization if they're not enrolled in Medicaid." (Tr. 70.) Later
that same day, Lucero reinstated Sean's Medicaid eligibility, and the Agency now takes
the position that Sean was continuously eligible. (Tr. 14-15, 23, 58-60, 91; Pet. Add.
27.) Therefore, the Agency's argument regarding the first element of estoppel is entirely
unsupported by the record and manifests bad faith.
The Agency next argues that the Hospital's reliance on the Agency's July 9
misrepresentations was not reasonable because the Hospital should have checked on
Sean's status again before the transplant on July 17. (Br. of Aplee. 28-30.) However,
given Ms. Lucero's prior practice of notifying the Hospital of eligibility updates (Tr. 29),
especially with a new application pending, the Hospital was justified in waiting one week
for the Agency's response. The Agency again attempts to shift attention to the time prior
to hospitalization (Br. of Aplee. 29), but to evaluate reasonable reliance, focus must
properly be on the period after the representations on which reliance is claimed. Finally,
the Agency asserts that "the Hospital's conduct cannot be deemed reasonable since it had
knowledge of all the facts and events necessary" to obtain prior authorization. (Br. of
Aplee. 30.) This assertion is utterly false and, again, manifests bad faith. The Hospital
did not know the one fact it needed to submit a prior authorization request form-that
Sean was Medicaid eligible on July 9, contrary to what the Agency had represented.
The case of Roberts v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 653 So. 2d 956 (Ala. 1995),
relied upon by the Agency, has nothing to do with Medicaid reimbursement or equitable
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estoppel. The insured was denied coverage for a surgery because she failed to obtain the
insurer's prior authorization. The court rejected her claim of fraudulent concealment
because there was "a complete lack of evidence that anything Blue Cross did or did not
do induced Roberts to act." Id. at 958. By contrast, the Agency in this case plainly
induced the Hospital to forego a prior authorization form and to submit instead an
application form to "reestablish eligibility." Instead of asserting that Sean was ineligible,
the Agency should have stated that, while Sean's eligibility was under review, he
remained eligible for the purpose of submitting a prior authorization request form. The
Agency also focuses on the computer error and lack of insurer follow-up in Roberts.
However, here, there was no computer error or any other excuse for the Agency's
misrepresentations. Moreover, the insurer in Roberts had no policy or prior practice of
following up on authorization requests or granting retroactive authorization. By contrast,
the Agency here did have such prior practices, and the Hospital reasonably relied on
those practices in waiting for the Agency's response. In short, Roberts does not involve
the misrepresentations and prior practices that justify estoppel in this case.
In summary, the Agency's conclusion that equitable estoppel does not apply finds
no support in the record or the findings of fact and must be set aside. Adams v. Board of
Review, supra.
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B,

Application of Estoppel to Government Entity.
The Agency argues that even if the elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied,

the injustice here is not of "sufficient gravity" to justify its application. (Br. of Aplee.
32-36.) However, the Agency misapplies the relevant legal standards.
In Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the Utah
Supreme Court held that estoppel may be invoked against a governmental entity in
"unusual circumstances 'where it is plain that the interests of justice so require.'" Id. at
827, quoting Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 795 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah App.
1990). Estoppel should be applied in such cases if "the facts may be found with such
certainty, and the injustice suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception." Id.,
quoting Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). See also
Holland v. Career Service Rev. Bd., 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993) (estoppel
applies against state institution when "it is plainly apparent that failing to apply the rule
would result in manifest injustice"). In Anderson, estoppel did not apply because there
was no clear evidence of any statement on which the plaintiff could have relied. 839
P.2d at 827-28. In Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm fn, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1993), on
which the Agency principally relies, this Court denied estoppel because the Tax
Commission letter on which the taxpayer relied was based on erroneous information
from the taxpayer. Id. at 908-09. Moreover, there was no "manifest injustice" because
the taxpayer in fact owed the taxes. Id. at 909.
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By contrast, this Court applied equitable estoppel in Eldredge v. Utah State
Retirement Bd., supra, because the Board clearly informed the plaintiff that he would not
have to purchase the additional years of prior service, and the plaintiff reasonably relied
on those communications in taking early retirement. 795 P.2d at 676. This Court
observed that a government body charged with dispensing information in the
administration of an important government program "bears a most stringent duty to
abstain from giving inaccurate or misleading advice." Id. Similarly, in Celebrity Club,
Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm % 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979), the court applied
estoppel because the Commission issued a letter advising the plaintiff that its planned
facility satisfied the statutory requirements, and the plaintiff relied on that representation
in expending $200,000 to complete the facility. Id. at 694-95.
The present case is more closely analogous to Eldredge and Celebrity Club than to
Anderson and Orton. Here, the Hospital relied on two different sources of Agency
information. First, Mr. Fairborn checked the Agency's computer data base, which
showed that no Medicaid card had been issued for July and that Sean was not Medicaid
eligible. In this computer age, the Agency's communication through its computer
network, made available to the Hospital, has the same force and effect as the letters
issued in Eldredge and Celebrity Club. Moreover, Mr. Fairborn verified Sean's status
personally with Ms. Lucero, the Agency's Medicaid eligibility officer who is stationed at
the Hospital for the very purpose of dispensing eligibility information to the Hospital.
Ms. Lucero confirmed that Sean was not eligible, that his eligibility was under review,
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and that a new application would have to be submitted to "reestablish eligibility." (Tr.
21.) Absent Medicaid eligibility, the Hospital could not submit a prior authorization
request form (Tr. 70); instead, in reliance on the Agency's representations of ineligibility,
Mr. Fairborn obtained and submitted a new application form (Tr. 21-22, 27-28). Ms.
Lucero subsequently reinstated Sean's eligibility, but she never notified the Hospital of
that act (Tr. 29, 58-60); moreover, the Hospital had no way of knowing of Lucero's
action because the Hospital has no access to the Agency's internal action logs (Tr. 4950). The Hospital also relied on the Agency's prior practices of notifying the Hospital of
eligibility updates and retroactive authorization, as discussed above.
These facts, clear and undisputed, and even supported by the hearing officer's
findings (Findings 5-7, 10, 13-14, Pet. Add. 4-5), present a case of "manifest injustice."
As a result of its reliance on the Agency's representations and prior practices, the
Hospital did not submit a prior authorization request form, and the Agency is now
withholding the $250,000 cost of Sean's transplant for failing to fax the form at the time
of Sean's admission (Tr. 93-94). This loss exceeds the amounts at stake in Eldredge and
Celebrity Club. Moreover, there is no question regarding the representations, as in
Anderson, supra, and those representations are not based on faulty information from the
plaintiff, as in Orton, supra. In addition, fairness requires that the Hospital be paid for its
good faith services rendered in a time of grave need to a little boy. The Agency has
identified no serious public harm that would result from paying the Hospital for its
admittedly necessary and appropriate services. By contrast, denial of payment will cause
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a serious loss of faith in the system and deter future participation by medical providers.
Accordingly, the injustice of withholding payment is "manifest" and sufficiently grave to
justify application of equitable estoppel In addition to cases cited in Petitioner's Brief,
see Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division, 613 P.2d 495, 499-500 (Or. App.
1980) (holding that equitable estoppel may apply to state agency that denied payment for
medical services for lack of prior authorization).
In summary, the conditions for applying equitable estoppel to a government
agency plainly exist in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Agency decision denying the Hospital reimbursement
for Sean's bone marrow transplant must be reversed. The necessity and appropriateness
of the services are undisputed, and withholding payment simply for not faxing a form
prior to the service is unauthorized and does not further the Agency's interest in
"efficient" operation of the Medicaid program. Lack of prior authorization alone is a
particularly inadequate basis to withhold payment when the Agency's own
misrepresentations precluded timely submission of the authorization request form. The
Agency's decision must also be set aside because of its deviation from the prior practices
of notifying the Hospital of eligibility updates and retroactive authorization. Finally,
because denial of payment on the undisputed facts of this case creates a manifest
injustice, this Court should apply equitable estoppel to prevent that injustice.
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Respectfully submitted this ~7~^ day of June, 1999

KIRTON & McCONKIE
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Assistant Attorney General
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515 East 100 South
P.O. Box 140835
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Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

t^^U^C^^ ^

23

^C^^W,

ADDENDUM
Index
Item

Page

1.

Notice of Denial (Dec. 24, 1997)

1

2.

Hospital letter responding to denial (Jan. 7. 1998)

5

3.

Amended Notice of Denial (Mar. 4, 1998)

6

4.

Second Amended Notice of Denial (July 23, 1998)

W:\4000\4456\0015\MfnPetitionersReplyBrfPld.wpd

24

11

OOOOOOI

JHki
•LUtah

Department
of Health
IVISION OF HEALTH
CAKE FINANCING

otaw 01 utan
BCdiadaLaavHt
Cwww
BodLBotit
Ex&utivtDfacdor
Michael Defr
Division Dimbr

BUREAU OF COVERAGE & REIMBURSEMENT POLICY
UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT UNIT
288 North 1460 West, Box 142904
Salt Lukts City, Utah 84114-2904
Telephone: (801) 538-6123

UMU-1710-97-U
CERTIFIED MAIL

December24, 1997
Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program
University of Utah School of Medicine
50 North Medical Drive
Saltiake City, Utah 84132
Re: Sean Daugaard
Medicaid # 0302605602

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA
Dear Dr. Keyes:
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following criteria have not been
met:
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization
1) Life Expectancy
R414-10A-6(3)(c): Medical literature from the transplant center documenting the
client's life expectancy, with and without a transplant. The transplant center staff
must complete and submit to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a
medical literature review documenting a probability of successful clinical
outcome for patients receiving transplantation for the specific age group, specific
diagnosjs.(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client.
This review of the medical literature must document an increase in life
expectancy between control group(s) and transplantation group(s). The
Department shall use independent research by medical consultant(s) to evaluate
the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
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Ted Keyes, M.D.
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2) Survival Rate Literature Reviews
R414-lOA-6f3)(o): The transplant center must document, by a current medical
literature review, a one-year survival rate from patients having received
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of
transplantation proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by the
Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life table method: "Kaplan, G.
Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of
American Statistical Association 53:457-481,1958. Cox, D.R., Oakes, D.
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated
by reference. At least ten patients in the appropriate age group must be alive at
the end of the one or three year period to document adequate confidence
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
R414-lOA*6f3Mq): Bone marrow transplantation centers must document, by a
current medical literature review, a one-year and a three-year survival rate from
patients having received transplantation for the age group, specific
diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
3) Written Recommendations
R414-10A-6f3Ur): The transplant center must provide written recommendations
for each client which support the need for the transplant. The recommendations
must reflect use of both the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and
the Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8 through 22.
Agreement of the transplant center to provide the required service must also be
established.
R414-10A-9: Criteria and Contraindications for Bone Marrow
Transplantation.
4) Survival Rate Literature Review
R414-10A-9(2Ka)(iii): The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to
the Department for evaluation, a current medical literature review, documenting
a probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater than or equal to
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75 percent one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year
survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for
the client. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
5) Life Expectancy and Medical Literature Review
R414-A10-9(3): The client for bone marrow transplantation must also meet
requirements of R414-10A-9f3Ma) or fbl.
a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone marrow disease with a
life expectancy of one year or less without transplantation or must have greater
than a five year increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation available.
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to the
Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical literature rev|ew;
documenting that the client's condition will cause irreversible, progressive
disease to vital end-organs within two years following the application for
transplant and have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to
transplantation available. The medical literature must also document that the
bone marrow transplantation will prevent irreversible, progressive disease to the
client's vital end-organs and must document that it will increase the life
expectancy of the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the
documentation submitted by the transplant center.
6) Any single contraindication listed below precludes approval for Medicaid
payment for bone marrow transplantation:
R414-lOA-9(5)fh) Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more years
or unless a current medical literature review, completed by the transplant center
staff and submitted to the Department for staff review and evaluation, documents
a greater than or equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the one-year and three-year
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survival rates after transplantation for the age group, specific cancer,
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
If you disagree with this decision you may request a hearing to appeal this decision.
To obtain the hearing you must complete the. enclosed Request For A Hearing Form
and file it with:
Division of Health Care Financing
Attention: Formal Hearings
Box 142901
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2901
The request must be filed within 30 days after the date of this letter. You may
represent yourself, or you may use legal counsel, a relative, friend, or a spokes person
to represent you. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will
constitute a waiver of your rights to a formal hearing.
Sincerely,

Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S.
Health Program Manager
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing Form
cc.

Parents of Sean Daugaard
4625 North Woodenshoe Road
Kamas, UT 84061
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January 7,1998
Ann G. Petersen, RN, MS
Health Program Manager
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
288 North 1460 West Box 142904
•Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-2904
Re:

Sean Daugaard
Medicaid #0302605602

Dear Ms. Petersen,
In your letter of 12/24/97 you have asked for further documentation of life expectancy and
literature support for transplant for Sean Daugaard. On 12/8/971 sent you two articles and a letter
reviewing both of these articles and going over the survival data as it applies to Sean and as it
meets the requirements of Medicaid. I have outlined specific figures on specific pages that
document better survival than Medicaid requirements. I am at a loss about how I can be clearer
about the contents these articles. If you need additional information other than what I have sent, I
would be happy to provide it but I have already provided the information ?hat you asked for in
your 12/24/97 letter. I would appreciate your attention to this matter and approval of this therapy
as soon as possible. If there are additional questions that I have not answered yet I would be very
happy to answer them.
Sincerely,

^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

^O

''Roberta H, Adams, MD
Director, Pediatric Blood and Marrow Transplant
RHA:ab
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UMU-270-98-U
CERTIFIED MAIL

March 4,1998
Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program
University of Utah School of Medicine
50 North Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132
Re: Sean Daugaard
Medicaid # 0302605602

SUBJECT: AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA
Dear Dr. Keyes:

R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization
1) Prior Authorization
R414-10A-6(1): Prior authorization is required for all transplantation services
except for cornea and kidney transplantation.
2) Life Expectancy
R414-10A-6(3)(c): Medical literature from the transplant center documenting the
client's life expectancy, with and without a transplant. The transplant center staff
must complete and submit to the Department for staff review and evaluation, a
medical literature review documenting a probability of successful clinical
outcome for patients receiving transplantation for the specific age group, specific
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client.
This review of the medical literature must document an increase in life
expectancy between control group(s) and transplantation group(s). The
Department shall use independent research by medical consultant(s) to evaluate
the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
Ted Keyes, M.D.
March 4,1998
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The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation.
3) Survival Rate Literature Reviews
R414-10A-6(3)(o): The transplant center must document, by a current medical
literature review, a one-year survival rate from patients having received
transplantation for the age group, specific diagnosis(es), condition and type of
transplantation proposed for the client. Survival rate must be calculated by the
Kaplan-Meier product-limit method or the actuarial life table method: "Kaplan, G.,
Meier, P. Non-Parametric estimation from incomplete observations. Journal of
American Statistical Association 53:457-481,1958, Cox, D.R., Oakes, D.
Analysis of survival data. Chapman and Hill, 1984." adopted and incorporated
by reference. At least ten patients in the appropriate age group must be alive at
the end of the one or three year period to document adequate confidence
intervals. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
R414-10A-6(3)(q): Bone marrow transplantation centers must document, by a
current medical literature review, a one-year and a three-year survival rate from
patients having received transplantation for the age group, specific
diagnosis(es), condition and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to 55 percent
three year survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone
marrow transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with
testicular relapse.
4) Written Recommendations
R414-10A-6(3)(r): The transplant center must provide written recommendations
for each client which support the need for the transplant. The recommendations
must reflect use of both the transplant center's own patient selection criteria and
the Utah Medicaid program criteria as noted in R414-10A-8 through 22.
Ted Keyes, M.D.
March 4,1998
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Agreement of the transplant center to provide the required service must also be
established.
The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation.
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to three year
survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone marrow
transplantation fpr bophenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with
testicular relapse.
R414-10A-9: Criteria and Contraindications for Bone Marrow
Transplantation.
5) Survival Rate Literature Review
R414-10A-9(2)(a)(iii): The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to
the Department for evaluation, a current medical literature review, documenting
a probability of successful clinical outcome by having a greater than or equal to
75 percent one-year survival rate, or by having a greater than or equal to 55
percent three-year survival rate or by meeting the one-year and three-year
survival rates for patients receiving bone marrow transplantation for the age
group, specific diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for
the client. The Department shall use independent research by staff medical
consultants to evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal to 55 percent
three year survival rate for children receiving a matched unrelated bone
marrow transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with
testicular relapse.

Ted Keyes, M.D.
March 4,1998
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6) Life Expectancy and Medical Literature Review
R414-A10-9(3): The client for bone marrow transplantation must also meet
requirements of R414-10A-9(3)(a) or (b).
a) The client must have irreversible, progressive bone marrow disease with a
life expectancy of one year or less without transplantation or must have greater
than a five year increase in life expectancy with transplantation, with no other
reasonable medical or surgical alternative to transplantation available.
(b) The transplant center staff must complete, and submit to the
Department for staff review and evaluation, a medical literature review
documenting that the client's condition will cause irreversible, progressive
disease to vital end-organs within two years following the application for
transplant and have no other reasonable medical or surgical alternative to
transplantation available. The medical literature must also document that the
bone marrow transplantation will prevent irreversible, progressive disease to the
client's vital end-organs and must document that it will increase the life
expectancy of the client by greater than five years. The Department shall use
independent research by staff medical consultants to evaluate the
documentation submitted by ihe transplant center.
The medical literature received does not document a five year increase in
life expectancy for children with biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia
with testicular relapse treated with standard therapy as compared to
children with matched unrelated bone marrow transplantation.
7) Any single contraindication listed below precludes approval for Medicaid
payment for bone marrow transplantation:
R414-10A-9(5)(h): Cancer, unless treated and eradicated for two or more years
or unless a current medical literature review, completed by the transplant center
staff and submitted to the Department for staff review and evaluation, documents
a greater than or equal to 75% one-year survival rate, or a greater than or equal
to 55 percent three-year survival rate, or by meeting the one-year and three-year
survival rates after transplantation for the age group, specific cancer,
diagnosis(es), condition, and type of transplantation proposed for the client. The
Department shall use independent research by staff medical consultants to
evaluate the documentation submitted by the transplant center.
Ted Keyes, M.D.
March 4, 1998
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The medical literature received does not document a greater than or equal
to 75 percent one year survival rate or a greater than or equal 55 percent
three year survival for children receiving a matched unrelated bone marrow
transplantation for biphenotypic acute lymphocytic leukemia with testicular
relapse.
If you disagree with this decision you may request a hearing to appeal this decision.
To obtain the hearing you must complete the enclosed Request For A Hearing Form
and file it with:
Division of Health Care Financing
Attention: Formal Hearings
PO Box 142901
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2901
The request must be filed within 30 days after the date of this letter. You may
represent yourself, or you may use legal counsel, a relative, friend, or a spokes person
to represent you. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal hearing will
constitute a waiver of your rights to a formal hearing.
Sincerely,

Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S.
Health Program Manager
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing form
cc:

Parents of Sean Daugaard
4625 North Woodenshoe Road
Kamas, UT 84061
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CERTIFIED MAIL

July 23, 1998
Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
Blood and Bone Marrow Transplant Program
University of Utah School of Medicine
50 North Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132
Re: Sean Daugaard
Medicaid # 0302605602

SUBJECT: AMENDED NOTICE OF DENIAL DUE TO LACK OF
SUBSTANTIATION OF MEDICAID CRITERIA
Dear Dr. Keyes:
This letter is to advise you Medicaid denies your request for funding for bone marrow
transplantation for the above-mentioned client. The following criteria have not been
met:
The following rules and criteria are applicable:
R414-10A-6 Prior Authorization

1) Prior Authorization Request
R414-10A-6(1): Prior authorization is required for all transplantation services
except for cornea and kidney transplantation.

awwi-x

0000012

Ted W. Keyes, M.D.
July 23,1998
Page 2

Prior authorization was not requested before the transplantation was
performed.
Sincerely,

Ann G. Petersen, R.N., M.S.
Health Program Manager
Bureau of Coverage and Reimbursement Policy
Enclosure: Request For A Hearing foam
cc:

Parents of Sean Daugaard
4625 North Woodenshoe Road
Kamas, UT 84061
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